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Will India need inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) to complete polio eradication?
‘Everything is created twice - first in the mind, then on the ground’
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The present situation
Our immediate goal in India is to interrupt wild
poliovirus transmission. In 2005 only 34 districts are
infected, with 55 cases of type 1 and 4 cases of type 3
polio, an all-time lowest record (http://w3.whosea.org/
vaccine). Cases are few and far between in time and
space. Transmission chains have weakened under
sustained heavy vaccination pressure. This year,
monovalent type 1 oral polio vaccine (OPV) was used
in site-specific surgical strikes and monovalent type 3
OPV will also be used soon. One dose of monovalent
vaccine is immunogenically worth three doses of
trivalent vaccine, accelerating the build-up of immunity
in the shortest possible time. Optimistically, wild virus
transmission could be interrupted within a few months,
but the road map beyond remains unclear. It will be
safer, hence wiser, to use IPV to conclude polio
eradication. Delay in decision may create a situation in
which we may not have what we need and cannot use
what we have. An answer to the question in the title
will emerge post facto, but by then the error might be
too costly.
In 1978 our Government decided to use OPV
exclusively, ignoring questions of its scientific validity.
In 1988 the Government signed the WHO resolution
for global polio eradication defined as ‘zero incidence
of wild poliovirus infection’, and continued the exclusive
use of OPV. The third opportunity for policy review is
now, but choices are more difficult than before.
Lessons from smallpox eradiaction
Smallpox (Variola) eradication is our guiding
precedent. Post-eradication, smallpox vaccine
(Vaccinia) was discontinued for epidemiological
(absence of target disease), economic (unnecessary
cost), and safety (vaccine adverse effects) reasons.
Vaccinia, heterologous species to Variola, neither
caused smallpox nor spread from the vaccinated to
others. Discontinuing vaccination had no adverse
epidemiological consequence. Contrarily, Sabin and
wild polioviruses are one species. Vaccine-associated
paralytic polio (VAPP) is identical to wild-virus-
polio, only far less frequent. Sabin viruses are
transmissible and may even seed circulation. During
intestinal replication, shedding and transmission, they
revert progressively towards wild-like genotype. Such
‘circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses’ (cVDPV)
cause polio, usually in clusters. Seven cVDPV
outbreaks have been recognised - in Egypt (during
1983-1993), Dominican Republic and Haiti (2000-
2001), Philippines (2001), Madagascar (2001-2002
and 2005), China (2004) and Indonesia (2005). VAPP
and cVDPV are ethically incompatible with
eradication. Hence true eradication is ‘zero incidence
of poliovirus infection, wild or vaccine’. Countries
using OPV must achieve eradication in two phases,
namely, W (wild viruses) and V (vaccine viruses), as
shown below.
Eradication AFP due to AFP due to AFP due to
Phase vaccine virus wild virus non-polio cause
Pre-eradication Yes Yes Yes
Phase W Yes No* Yes
Phase V No* No* Yes
AFP-Acute flaccid paralysis, the clinical presentation of poliomyelitis
*Absence of disease for three years in spite of sensitive surveillance
is surrogate for zero incidence of infection
Can we safely stop OPV?
Many experts assume that OPV can be discontinued
after achieving phase W and phase V will occur
automatically. This simple approach is not safe.  Near-
hundred per cent vaccination coverage with multiple
(>10) doses of OPV is essential not only to interrupt
wild virus transmission, but also as a deterrent against
the emergence of cVDPV. Viruses from the vial are
safer than vaccine-derived viruses in transmission. The
higher the immunity barrier constructed by
vaccination, the lower the probability of vaccine virus
transmission. When this deterrent is diluted, by the
decline of the number of doses per child or of coverage
with multiple doses, the consequence is to promote
cVDPV. Such decline is likely to occur (intentionally
or unintentionally) after we reach phase W. This
scenario was the predisposing factor in six outbreaks
of cVDPV.
Continuing OPV post-phase W is unethical on
account of VAPP. Slow withdrawal is risky. What if
OPV is stopped simultaneously in the country (or the
whole world)? It is not known if the risk of cVDPV
will decrease or increase in the sandwich period of
time when recently vaccinated and virus-shedding
children remain in proximity to unvaccinated children.
If even one chain of transmission develops, the
outcome may lead to cVDPV. This risk may be very
low, but is not zero. If cVDPV emerges, it will be very
difficult to control.
Is the risk of cVDPV, even as small as it might be,
worth taking, considering the 4 billion dollars of direct
expenditure and an estimated equal amount of indirect
expenditure that the world has put in already for global
polio eradication efforts? If cVDPV were to emerge,
there will be a delay of one year or more before it is
discovered. By then it would have spread widely,
silently, even across national borders. Should we then
flood the community with OPV (monovalent or
trivalent) to eradicate the cVDPV, knowing that young
children in surrounding communities will be naïve to
polioviruses, wild and vaccine? Is it ethical or
scientifically acceptable to re-introduce OPV into a
world with no vaccination, when the probability of
transmission and circulation will be higher than now?
Are we willing to risk the entire investment of
eradication for the sake of the cheapest or simplest of
all future options? In the un-chartered sea ahead, are
we confident our Titanic is un-sinkable?
An alternate deterrent against cVDPV perhaps is
wise, before withdrawing OPV. The only rational option,
therefore, is to introduce IPV in preparation of
withdrawing OPV. Scandinavian countries went from
wild virus endemic state directly to elimination phase
V, by the exclusive use of IPV. Germany, France, USA,
Canada, UK, New Zealand and virtually all other rich
countries went sequentially through phase W using
OPV, and phase V using IPV. There is no alternative
model available for India to adopt. The question posed
in the title remains relevant only in developing countries,
highlighting the rich-poor divide in risk-perception and
risk-management.
Will IPV solve our problems?
The IPV solution of the cVDPV problem is fraught
with formidable but not insurmountable obstacles.
Globally the demand for IPV is more than its supply
as it is made by only two European manufacturers.
Short supply pushes price up, but rich countries pay
the price for the safety of their children. India had
contributed to this crisis by closing down (1993-1994)
what was begun as a large public sector IPV production
company in Gurgaon in1987-88. IPV was successfully
manufactured in private sector, in Pune (1987-88), but
that was also disallowed by the Government.
Technology for its manufacture can be re-established
if the Government so decides. If made here, the cost
will be affordable.
Can we achieve 90 per cent coverage with three
doses of IPV? If there is will, there will be a way.  In
Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Goa, DPT third-dose coverage
exceeds 95 per cent, and IPV-combined DPT will
simplify immunization. The reason of poor
performance in other States is defective management,
not public diffidence in vaccines. The success factors
of Tamil Nadu must be replicated in other States not
only to conclude polio eradication but also to prevent
death due to measles and diphtheria. India signed the
eradication-by-2000 pledge in 1988 but took no steps
to accelerate polio control. In 1995-1996, with time
running out, India resorted to management by crisis,
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without a long-term plan. All hopes were pinned
on OPV by campaigns, undervaluing routine
immunization. Had our regular vaccine been DPT-IPV,
and OPV was used in campaigns, we could have had
the best of both vaccines, and eradication achieved
earlier and cheaper, and the transition to IPV
simplified. The bonus would have been the true
strengthening of our universal immunization
programme (UIP). Polio eradication would have
actually been, and would have been seen to be, the
fruit of UIP, instead of another ‘vertical’ project,
perceived by some to be in competition.
We do not have direct evidence that IPV will act as a
deterrent against cVDPV. It would have been safe to
assume so, if we had data on its ability to interrupt
transmission of wild viruses in developing countries.
That no study had addressed this question illustrates
the problem of man-made bias against IPV. India should
have stayed clear of the Western controversy between
the two poliovaccines. Indian studies had shown very
low efficacy of OPV and very high efficacy of IPV.
Western studies showed complete safety of IPV but not
of OPV. Yet, India waited for the West to settle the
controversy, but when they finally chose IPV, we are
caught with our bridge burned behind us. Considering
the high vaccine efficacy and herd effect of IPV in
developed countries, and no evidence of their geographic
variation in developing countries, we must assume that
IPV will act as a deterrent against cVDPV. Clearly, every
future option is based on assumptions. Therefore, now
more than ever before, choice must be based on the safest
assumption, which calls for wisdom and foresight.
Will the use of wild virus for manufacturing IPV
pose a risk of accidental release at factory sites?
Stringent containment measures are necessary, no doubt.
The Japanese approach to this problem is to make ‘Salk
vaccine out of Sabin viruses’ - so that the risk from stock
live viruses is reduced. We do not seem to have the
necessary time for capacity building to produce Sabin-
Salk vaccine. We can transition from regular IPV to
Sabin-IPV in due course. The priority must be to
introduce IPV and discontinue OPV, for which the
standard IPV could be used until Sabin-IPV becomes
available.
Who must decide for India?
That there is no consensus among world experts on
the need for IPV in developing countries points to the
complexities behind the question. In a public health
programme of such enormity and cost as global
poliomyelitis eradication, one cannot wish away
complexities. As far as India is concerned, we must face
the question as a priority national issue, while the world
experts grapple with it at global level. India’s decision
may even influence global thinking. Thus, we have an
opportunity and an obligation to decide in our best
interests, which will help other developing countries
also. The Government of India must debate all options.
If the consensus among experts chosen by the
Government is that India will need IPV, then action is
needed now. If IPV is not considered necessary, nothing
changes for now. In any case, the decision must be taken
by India now rather than waiting for a WHO decision,
which may take time. The three possible approaches
that WHO could adopt are: (i) to decline to give clear
guidelines, letting countries themselves decide; (ii) to
advise that OPV could be discontinued after wild virus
eradication, and offer stockpiles of OPV in case cVDPV
emerges; and (iii) to recommend IPV.
Conclusion
The question in the title deserves an answer. If
IPV is considered the safer option, its production
needs financial investment and time. Once standard
IPV is made, switching to Sabin viruses as source
material may be easier than starting de novo with
them. Whatever the Government’s policy - not to use
IPV, or to use standard IPV, or Sabin-Salk vaccine,
or the two in sequence - it must be articulated without
delay.
(The views are personal and not of any organization
with which the author is associated)
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